Seeing Is Not Believing: Exploiting Mismatched Control and Monitoring Frequencies to Mount Stealthy Attacks in Industrial Control Systems

1. Obtain the Entropy bit state transition:

python ./data_segmentation/data_extraction.py

2. Obtain the value of identified PLC variables, with varying alpha_list and beta_list

python ./data_segmentation/segmenting_utils.py

python ./customized_SCADA.py

python ./stealthy_attack.py

The exploitation of "Force" function for Siemens PLC and Rockwell PLC is coming soon!

If you use PLCSage for your research, please cite Mismatched Control and Monitoring Frequencies: Vulnerability, Attack, and Mitigation.

bibtex
@article{yang2024mismatched,
  title={Mismatched Control and Monitoring Frequencies: Vulnerability, Attack, and Mitigation},
  author={Yang, Zeyu and He, Liang and Cheng, Peng and Chen, Jiming},
  journal={IEEE Transactions on Dependable and Secure Computing},
  year={2024},
  publisher={IEEE}
}