The mcp-imagemagick server processes image files using ImageMagick and darktable. As with any system that processes user-provided files, there are inherent security considerations to be aware of.

ImageMagick is a powerful image processing tool that supports numerous file formats. Some of these formats can contain embedded code or references to external resources, which historically have been exploited for:

1. Remote Code Execution (RCE) - Malicious files could execute arbitrary commands
2. Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) - Files could trigger requests to internal resources
3. Denial of Service (DoS) - Crafted images could consume excessive resources
4. Information Disclosure - Specially crafted files could read arbitrary files

The most notable example was "ImageTragick" (CVE-2016-3714), where ImageMagick's processing of MVG and SVG files could be exploited for remote code execution.

While mcp-imagemagick currently focuses on DNG to WebP conversion (lower risk formats), we still inherit ImageMagick's attack surface because:

• ImageMagick performs file type detection by content, not extension
• A malicious file disguised as a DNG could potentially be processed as a different format
• We execute ImageMagick with the same permissions as the MCP server

Ensure your system's ImageMagick has a properly configured policy.xml file. Common locations:

• /etc/ImageMagick-7/policy.xml
• /etc/ImageMagick-6/policy.xml
• /usr/local/etc/ImageMagick-7/policy.xml

Recommended restrictions for web-facing services:

<policymap>
  <!-- Disable vulnerable coders -->
  <policy domain="coder" rights="none" pattern="EPHEMERAL" />
  <policy domain="coder" rights="none" pattern="URL" />
  <policy domain="coder" rights="none" pattern="HTTPS" />
  <policy domain="coder" rights="none" pattern="HTTP" />
  <policy domain="coder" rights="none" pattern="FTP" />
  <policy domain="coder" rights="none" pattern="MVG" />
  <policy domain="coder" rights="none" pattern="MSL" />
  <policy domain="coder" rights="none" pattern="TEXT" />
  <policy domain="coder" rights="none" pattern="LABEL" />
  
  <!-- Allow only specific safe formats -->
  <policy domain="coder" rights="read|write" pattern="PNG" />
  <policy domain="coder" rights="read|write" pattern="JPEG" />
  <policy domain="coder" rights="read|write" pattern="WEBP" />
  <policy domain="coder" rights="read" pattern="DNG" />
  
  <!-- Set resource limits -->
  <policy domain="resource" name="memory" value="1GB"/>
  <policy domain="resource" name="map" value="2GB"/>
  <policy domain="resource" name="width" value="16KP"/>
  <policy domain="resource" name="height" value="16KP"/>
  <policy domain="resource" name="time" value="120"/>
</policymap>

Consider running the MCP server:

• As a dedicated user with minimal privileges
• In a containerized environment (Docker, Podman)
• With filesystem restrictions (only access to necessary directories)
• Behind appropriate network isolation

While our server performs basic validation, consider additional measures:

• Verify file extensions match content
• Limit file sizes before processing
• Scan files with antivirus if processing untrusted sources
• Implement rate limiting to prevent DoS

Regularly update:

• ImageMagick to the latest version
• darktable to the latest version
• This MCP server
• System packages and dependencies

Check for updates:

# Check ImageMagick version
convert -version

# Check for known vulnerabilities
# Visit: https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvekey.cgi?keyword=imagemagick

Monitor for suspicious activity:

• Unusual resource consumption during conversions
• Failed conversion attempts with strange errors
• Access to unexpected file paths

The MCP server logs to stderr, so ensure these logs are captured and reviewed.

• Use default ImageMagick policies
• Process only your own test files
• Run with your user permissions

• Implement strict ImageMagick policy.xml
• Run in isolated container/VM
• Use dedicated service account
• Process files from trusted sources only
• Implement proper authentication on MCP client

• All production recommendations plus:
• Run behind a reverse proxy
• Implement file upload scanning
• Use temporary directories with automatic cleanup
• Consider using cloud-based image processing services instead

• ImageMagick Security Policy
• ImageMagick Security Policy Evaluator
• ImageTragick Vulnerability Info
• CVE Database - ImageMagick

If you discover a security vulnerability in mcp-imagemagick, please:

1. Do not create a public GitHub issue
2. Send details to the repository maintainers
3. Allow reasonable time for a fix before public disclosure

This software is provided "as is" without warranty. Users are responsible for evaluating security risks in their specific deployment context. Processing untrusted image files always carries inherent risks.